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Abstract
Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2008) argued that dependence on foreign oil raises the like-
lihood of equilibrium indeterminacy (economic instability) for oil importing countries. We
argue that this relation is more subtle. The endogenous choices of prices and quantities by
a cartel of oil exporters, such as the OPEC, can a¤ect the directions of the changes in the
likelihood of equilibrium indeterminacy. We show that uctuations driven by self-fullling
expectations under oil shocks are easier to occur if the cartel sets the price of oil, but the re-
sult is reversed if the cartel sets the quantity of production. These results o¤er a potentially
interesting explanation for the decline in economic volatility (i.e., the Great Moderation)
in oil importing countries since the mid-1980s when the OPEC cartel changed its market
strategies from setting prices to setting quantities, despite the fact that oil prices are far
more volatile today than they were 30 years ago.
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1 Introduction
The empirical literature has suggested that oil price shocks have an important e¤ect on economic
activity (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1983, 1996, and 2003; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Gisser and
Goodwin, 1986; Aguiar-Conraria and Wen, 2007; and Kilian, 2008). It is also known that there
was a structural change for the macroeconomic impact of oil, which occurred at some point
in the mid-1980s (see, e.g., Mork, 1989; Hooker, 1996; Hamilton, 1996 and 2003; and Aguiar-
Conraria and Soares, 2011). This has been interpreted as evidence of a nonlinear or time-varying
relationship between oil prices and economic activity.
We do not dispute these interpretations. However, we do call attention to a change in the
behavior of the Oil Price Exporting Countries (OPEC) that occurred in the mid-1980s. On
their o¢ cial website, it is written that "OPEC did in fact set crude oil prices from the early
1970s to the mid-1980s", but that they stopped doing so thereafter. We also read that OPEC
imposes production quotas to its members and meets twice a year to dene their oil production
policies. This change in OPECs behavior is not unexpected. Deneckere (1983), Majerus (1988),
Rothchild (1992) and Lambertini and Schultz (2003) argue that, as long as the produced goods
are substitutes for each other, a quantity-setter cartel is more stable than a price-setter. Given
that crude oil extracted in any particular country is a perfect substitute for crude oil extracted
in other countries, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities as the control variable.
It is known that tari¤s and quotas are not equivalent instruments; unless perfect competition
is assumed everywhere in both domestic and foreign markets (see Bhagwati, 1965). From the
perspective of the exporters, it is also known that setting prices and setting production quotas
are not equivalent (e.g. see Weitzman, 1974; and Cooper and Riezman, 1989). Given that 60%
of the crude oil traded internationally comes from OPEC members, their strategic decisions are
bound to have important implications. In this paper we study the implications of such behavior
on equilibrium indeterminacy.
Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2008) argued that dependence on foreign oil raises the likelihood
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of equilibrium indeterminacy. In this paper, we show that this result depends crucially on the
cartels choice of the control variable: price or quantity. To be more precise, we show that
di¤erent cartel strategies create di¤erent macroeconomic propagation mechanisms for oil shocks.
If the exporting cartel xes the price of oil, then the likelihood of macroeconomic indeterminacy
in the importing country is dramatically increased, while exactly the reverse happens if the cartel
chooses to x the quantity of oil production.
2 The Importance of Equilibrium Indeterminacy
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are one of the modern workhorses in
macroeconomics. In standard DSGE models with perfect competition and constant returns,
there exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Therefore, there is no independent role
for beliefs to inuence the economic fundamentals. However, the pioneering work of Benhabib
and Farmer (1994) has shown that a standard neoclassical growth model with externalities or
increasing returns to scale may exhibit a continuum of rational expectations equilibria  equilib-
rium indeterminacy. In such models, beliefs can be self-fullling and a¤ect resource allocations
in equilibrium, thus can serve as an independent source of the business cycle. However, this rst
generation of belief-driven business cycle models was considered empirically implausible because
they required externalities larger than empirical estimates. Subsequent works have shown that
features such as additional sectors of production, durable consumption goods, small open econ-
omy, variable capacity utilization, high elasticity of substitutions between capital and labor can
reduce the degree of externalities required for indeterminacy to an empirically plausible range
(see, e.g., Wen, 1998; Benhabib, Nishimura and Meng, 2000; Weder, 2001; Meng and Velasco,
2003; Meng, 2003; Bian and Meng, 2004; Pintus, 2006; and Wang and Wen, 2008; among many
others).1
1For a general analysis of this class of models regarding mechanisms giving rise to local indeterminacy, see
Wen (2001). For the broader literature on sunspots and self-fullling propechies, please see Shell (1977, 1987),
Cass and Shell (1983), Shell and Smith (1992), Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), and Woodford
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Equilibrium indeterminacy implies that optimism and pessimism about the future can be
self-fullling. In such a model, a fear or speculation of an increase in the imported oil price,
say due to political instability in the foreign country, can trigger pessimism, generating a reces-
sion (Aguiar-Conraria and Wen, 2008). Economies with equilibrium indeterminacy will, ceteris
paribus, exhibit higher volatility than an economy with equilibrium determinacy.
It is now a well-received stylized fact that the volatility of GDP has signicantly decreased
since the mid-1980s in the United States and other industrialized countries (e.g. see McConnell
and Pérez-Quirós, 2000; Blanchard and Simon, 2001; and Gallegati and Gallegati 2007; among
others). If one could make a case arguing that developed economies had equilibrium indetermi-
nacy before the mid-1980s, then this would be an intriguing explanation for the Great Moderation
after the mid-1980s.2
There is a second important implication of equilibrium indeterminacy. Aguiar-Conraria and
Wen (2007) showed that the macroeconomic propagation mechanism for oil shocks was quite
di¤erent in a model with indeterminacy from a standard model. In fact, an endogenous multiplier-
accelerator mechanism can emerge, giving rise to persistent and hump-shaped uctuations in
aggregate output. For example, after a negative oil-price shock, output not only decreases in the
impact period but also continues to decrease over time until a turning point, leading to a deeper
and U-shaped slump. However, after the turning point the propagation mechanism reverses itself,
leading to a cumulative process of recovery and expansion. This type of uctuations is not to
be expected in a model with equilibrium determinacy. Given that the propagation mechanism
is so di¤erent from that of standard DSGE models, optimal monetary policy is also expected to
be di¤erent. Nakov and Pescatori (2010) provide some evidence that oil shocks may have had a
prominent role in explaining the Great Moderation. Our argument in this paper provides yet
another explanation for why this might be the case.
(1986a, 1986b, 1991).
2A related point was made by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), who concluded that the U.S. monetary policy be-
fore 1982 was consistent wity indeterminacy, while after 1982 it was consistent with a unique rational expectations
equilibrium.
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3 The Model
Our baseline model is a continuous time version of Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2007 and 2008). In
the model a representative agent3 chooses a trajectory of consumption (ct), working hours (nt),
capacity utilization (ut), quantity of oil demand (et), and capital accumulation ( _kt) to solve:
max
c;n;u;e;k
Z 1
0
exp ( t)

log(ct)  n
1+
t
1 + 

dt (1)
subject to
_kt =  tkt + yt   ct   ptet (2)
yt = t (utkt)
k nnt e
e
t ; k; n; e  0, and k + n + e = 1 (3)
t =
1

ut ,  > 1; (4)
where pt denotes oil price and et the quantity of imported oil. The agent pays ptet in terms of
output to foreigners to receive oil imports. Note that this is not a model of international trade.
The international trade balance is always zero. Foreigners are paid in goods. This is clear in
the budget constraint, according to which domestic production is divided between consumption,
investment and oil imports. So part of what is produced domestically is used to pay for the
imports (ptet). This is the interpretation of Finn (2000), Wei (2003) and Aguiar-Conraria and
Wen (2007 and 2008) in similar models. The rate of capital depreciation, t, is time varying and
is endogenously determined in the model by equation (4), which states that capital depreciates
faster if used more intensively. Agents take as given the aggregate productivity t:
t = (utkt)
k nnt e
e
t : (5)
3Our representative-agent model can be mapped into a decentralized Dixt-Stiglitz style model where hetero-
geneous rms are monopolists with increasing returns technology. For details of such a mapping, see Benhabib
and Wen (2004).
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With this assumption, note that the economy exhibits increasing returns to scale of degree 1+.
From the standard rst order conditions, we can obtain the optimal demand equation for oil:
ptet = eyt: (6)
To close the model, we consider two extreme assumptions (we will relax them later) about
the oil producers decision. Our rst hypothesis states that the oil cartel is a quantity-setting
cartel and, therefore, prices will adjust. In this scenario, the oil importing country will take the
quantity of oil as given: et = e. Our second hypothesis assumes that the cartel xes prices:
pt = p:
The rst order conditions with respect to fct; nt; et; ut; ktg and the budget constraint can be
simplied to the following system:
_ct
ct
=

   1

k
yt
kt
  

(7)
_kt =

k
   1

+ n

yt   ct (8)
ct = n
yt
n1+t
(9)
ut =

k
yt
kt
 1

(10)
yt = Ak
(1+)kk
t n
(1+)nn
t e
(1+)ee
t ; (11)
where,  k  ( 1)( (1+)k) , n =  e  ( (1+)k) , and A is a constant.
Assuming that et = e, and substituting this into equation (11), we derive the reduced-form
production function:
yt = B(e)k
k(1+)k
t n
n(1+)n
t ; (12)
where the coe¢ cient B(e) depends on and increases with e.
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If we assume p = p instead and substitute et =
eyt
p
in the production function (11), we can
derive an alternative reduced-form production function:
yt = C(p)k
k(1+)k
1 e(1+)n
t n
n(1+)n
1 e(1+)n
t ; (13)
where C(p) depends negatively on p: In both cases, solving the above system of equations in the
steady state gives the following steady-state values and ratios:
y
k
=

k

   1 (14)
c
y
= k

   1


+ n (15)
c
k
=
 ((   1)k + n)
(   1)k (16)
n =

n
(   1)k + n
 1
1+
(17)
 =

   1 : (18)
The results are formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The cartel strategy does not a¤ect the steady-state values.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple: in a world without aggregate uncertainty
(shocks), the cartels behavior is irrelevant. However, the picture changes if we consider the
dynamics of the model away from the steady state.
3.1 Dynamic Analysis I: Fixing Quantity
Taking the imported quantity of oil, e, as given, the reduced-form production function is given
by equation (12). Note that the higher the share of oil, the lower the e¤ective returns to scale
on capital and labor:  k (1 + )k + n (1 + )n: It is known from the literature that higher
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increasing returns facilitate the existence of indeterminacy, therefore one would expect that the
larger the share of imported oil the larger the necessary true returns to scale (1 + ) in order to
have indeterminacy. We formalize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the quantity of imported oil is taken as exogenous, the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for local indeterminacy are given by
1  k
k
>  >
 (1 + )  n   k (1 + )
n + k (1 + )
: (19)
Proof. Linearizing the rst order conditions around the steady-state and simplifying, we get a
system of two linear di¤erential equations,
0B@ _ct
_kt
1CA =MQ
0B@ ct
kt
1CA : (20)
The model exhibits local indeterminacy if and only if the real part of the eigenvalues of MQ are
both negative. This is true if and only if the determinant of MQ is positive and the trace of MQ
is negative. For the determinant, after some algebra one concludes that
det (MQ) > 0 () (1   k (1 + )k) (1 + )
n (1 + )n   (1 + ) > 0: (21)
Which, in turn, is equivalent to
1  k
k
>  >
 (1 + )  n   k (1 + )
n + k (1 + )
: (22)
For the trace, one gets that
Tr (MQ) =
  ((   1) (1 + )k + n) (1 + ) 
n(1 + )   (1 + ) (   (1 + )k) : (23)
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The numerator is negative, so Tr(M) < 0 if the denominator is positive. This is the case if and
only if
 >
 (1 + )  n   k (1 + )
n + k (1 + )
; (24)
which is the same as the second inequality of (19).
For any set of realistic values, the binding constraint is this second inequality. An increase
in e, holding either n or k constant, will increase the term on the right hand side, making
indeterminacy harder to occur.
3.2 Dynamic Analysis II: Fixing Prices
Take the price of oil, p, as given. Introducing equation (5) and u =
 
k
y
k
 1
 into the production
function, we get the reduced-form production function in equation (13). We can see there that
reliance on imported oil amplies the true returns to scale. Formally, we have:
Proposition 3 If the price of imported oil is exogenous, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for local indeterminacy are given by
n
1  n >  >
 (1 + ) (1  e)  n   k (1 + )
n + (k + e) (1 + )
: (25)
Proof. See Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2008).
For plausible parameter values the rst inequality on the left-hand side of the above equation
is not binding. Based on the inequality on the right-hand side, we conclude that, keeping either
n or ak constant, the larger the share of imported oil the smaller the required externalities for
the model to exhibit local indeterminacy.
3.3 Calibration Exercise
Propositions 2 and 3 tell us that whether a countrys reliance on imported oil increases or
decreases its probability of indeterminacy depends crucially on the market strategy of the oil
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producers: if the cartel xes oil prices, then the required externalities for local indeterminacy
is lowered, while the reverse happens if the cartel xes quantity of oil supply. We calibrate the
model to check the magnitude of such e¤ects. We set the inverse labor supply elasticity  = 0
(Hansens indivisible labor), the rate of time preference  = 0:01,  = 1:4 (implying  = 0:025),
and the labor elasticity of output n = 0:65.
Table 1. Required Returns to Scale for Indeterminacy
Oil Share (e) Price Setting Cartel Quantity Setting Cartel
0% 1:111 1:111
5% 1:094 1:157
10% 1:077 1:207
The cost share of imported oil in GDP is between 2% to 8% for several western economies (see
Aguiar-Conraria and Wen 2008). Returns to scale in many industrial countries are around 1:1.
For example, Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) found a value of between 1.091.11 for the United
Sates; Inklaar (2007) estimated 1.16 for Germany and 1.12 for France; Hansen and Knowles
(1998) found 1.105 for high income OECD countries; Miyagawa et al. (2006) found 1.075 for
Japan; and Kwack and Sun (2005) 1.1 for South Korea.
Table 1 shows that, depending on the cartels market strategies of price setting or quantity
setting, reliance on imported oil can signicantly change a countrys likelihood of indeterminacy,
thereby making the country more (or less) susceptible to sunspots-driven uctuations and to
having a hump-shaped propagation mechanism under oil shocks. For example, the middle row
in Table 1 shows that a country with returns to scale in the order of 1:1 and with oil imports
that account roughly for 5% of GDP (like the Netherlands or Portugal) will have equilibrium
indeterminacy if the cartel sets the price, and will have a unique rational expectations equilibrium
if the cartel sets the quantity.
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3.4 Intermediate Case
In reality, there is no oil cartel that controls the entire production of oil or natural gas in the
world. Even if it were the case, it is one thing to control the total amount of oil exports and
another to dene the amount of oil that each country can import. Our previous results were
based on extreme assumptions about the cartel behavior. In one case, we assumed that the
quantity was xed and that the price would freely adjust. This assumption implies zero price
elasticity for oil. In another case, we assumed that price was xed and that quantities would
freely adjust, which implies an innitely elastic supply curve for oil. Now, we relax these extreme
assumptions and allow for an imperfectly elastic supply of oil. This is probably a more realistic
assumption which should give the reader more condence in our results.
To incorporate an imperfectly elastic supply, we assume that oil is supplied by a monopolist
whose objective function is to maximize prot:
f = ptet   d
1 + z
e1+zt ; (26)
where the cost function of oil is convex (z 2 [0;1]). Given the demand function of oil from the
home country, ptet = eyt; prot maximization implies that the supply curve for oil is given by
pt =
d
e
ezt ; (27)
where 1=z measures the elasticity of supply.
Proceeding as before, it is easy to show that when supply meets demand, the home countrys
reduced-form production function becomes:
yt = Dk
k(1+)k
1  e1+z (1+)n
t n
n(1+)n
1  e1+z (1+)n
t ; (28)
with D depending negatively on the cost parameter d.
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The two extreme cases we studied above are the limiting cases of the above production
function either as z ! 0 (xed price) or as z ! 1 (xed quantity). Therefore, the exact
relationship between oils cost share in GDP and the likelihood of indeterminacy depends on the
value of the elasticity of supply.
Proposition 4 If oil is supplied by a monopolist, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for local
indeterminacy are given by
1    e
1+z
+ k
 
e
1+z
+ k
 >  >  (1 + )  1  e1+z  n   k (1 + )
n +
 
k +
e
1+z


(1 + )
: (29)
Proof. The proof is similar to proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.
Again, for realistic values, the rst inequality on the left-hand side of the above equation is
not binding. Looking at the second inequality, we can see that the share of imported oil on local
indeterminacy depends on parameter z.
Assuming that foreign oil is mainly a substitute for capital, hence when e increases, n
remains constant and k decreases, then for z >    1 an increase of e will increase the term
in the right hand side of equation (29), so indeterminacy is harder to arise. If z <    1, then
indeterminacy becomes easier to arise. If z =    1, the impact is null. If we assume that
imported oil is mainly a substitute for labor, the threshold value for z is . So the larger is e
the harder is for indeterminacy to occur, as long as z > .
Therefore, the main implications of propositions 2 and 3 survive: if oil supply is less elastic
then indeterminacy is less likely to occur. The result is reversed for a more price elastic supply
curve.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the consequence of reliance on foreign oil for macroeconomic (in)stability.
We showed that the likelihood of equilibrium indeterminacy is a function of the market strategy
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of the oil exporting countries. In particular, indeterminacy arises more easily for oil importing
countries if the oil cartel sets prices and the reverse is true if it sets quantities.
We are perfectly aware that our model is highly stylized, at least in four aspects. (i) It
does not model international trade. Instead it assumes balanced trade (imports are fully paid in
goods). This simplication avoids dealing with exchange rates and endogenous demand for the
exported goods of oil importing countries. (ii) It does not model the behavior of the oil exporting
cartel in a game theoretic framework. (iii) There is no endogenous oil supply or production in
the oil-importing country. (iv) The mobility of labor and capital across borders is not considered.
Our results may hinge on these assumptions. Extending the model to include standard features
of an open economy and allow domestic production of oil and factor mobility is left as a future
research topic.
In spite of these simplications, we believe that our results are su¢ ciently interesting. We
showed that the relation between oil-dependence and equilibrium indeterminacy is more subtle
than what was described in Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2008). Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2008)
concluded that the stronger the dependence on foreign oil the larger the likelihood of indetermi-
nacy. In this paper we showed that this is true only if one assumes that oil exporters act like a
cartel that xes the price of oil (or at least if the supply curve is very price elastic). If, instead,
oil exporters x the quantity then the result is completely reversed  indeterminacy becomes
much more unlikely. Using the information provided by OPEC, we know that OPECs market
strategy has changed in the 1980s. Combining that information with the implications of our
model, it is possible that the U.S. economy has moved from a state of equilibrium indeterminacy
to a state of equilibrium determinacy. This implication provides an alternative explanation to
the Great Moderation.
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